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**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT** 

OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Compr

Honorable Allen W. Dulles Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington 25, D. C.

JUN 🕴 1955

OB 11 - FE - NOTE OFF

Dear Mr. Dulles:

As a part of our communications mobilization planning, we have completed an analysis of some of the steps that might be taken to minimize the vulnerability of our strategic overseas radio circuits in the event of intentional enemy jamming.

Present plans of the Department of Defense for forward scatter radio systems across the Atlantic scheduled for completion this year, the new Trans-Atlantic telephone cable to be completed next year, and the present multi-routes of high frequency radio systems should afford us a relatively secure system.

In conjunction with representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Communications Commission and this Office, a staff study has been prepared outlining appropriate measures that might be taken to minimize the vulnerability of our Trans-Pacific services. Attached is a copy of the study, in which I concur. Subject to your comments and those of the heads of the other agencies mentioned above, we plan to start exploratory discussions with the telephone and telegraph companies to determine the practicability of a modern telephonetelegraph-type cable between San Francisco and Honolulu for service late in 1957 or early 1958.

Since the timing of this project is of utmost importance, I should like to have your views not later than July 1, 1955.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur S. Flemming

Director

Cc: Mr. Perry Johnson - CIA

Encl: "Trans-Pacific Cable Projects--

Anti-Jamming Measures"

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

May 27, 1955

SUBJECT: Trans-Pacific Cable Projects -- Anti-jamming Measures

All Trans-Pacific communications are by radio except for a single British cable from Vancouver, British Columbia to Australia. A Pacific Ocean cable owned by the Commercial Pacific Cable Company was abandoned at the outbreak of World War II, and a recent review of the situation indicates that this cable is electrically intact between San Francisco, Honolulu, Midway and Guam. The sections between Guam and Wanila and Guam and Tokyo are not in usable condition. All terminal equipment has been removed. Negotiations have been underway since September 1954 looking towards the possible purchase of the cable for use only as a standby facility in case of emergency. Transmission speeds would be slow and it would not be economical to operate on a day-to-day basis. The company's original offer to sell the cable for \$1,008,000 is a matter of continuing review. A reasonable figure for purchasing the cable and equipping it is considered to be about 3250,000. About one year would be required to obtain the necessary terminal equipment and rehabilitate the cable for use. Forward scatter radio systems could be used beyond Guam to minimize the possibility of jamming.

The Government franchise authorizing the cable provides that the Federal Government may seize and use the cable at any time in connection with a national emergency, and precludes removal without permission.

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The possibility of a modern-design telephone-telegraph cable across the Pacific comparable to the new Trans-Atlantic telephone cable now under construction has been considered. Such a cable is technically feasible with present day techniques. Manufacturing capabilities would be available which would permit a Trans-Pacific cable to be laid as far as Honolulu by the Fall of 1957 and to the Orient by late 1958 or early 1959 if the Atlantic Cable is completed by the summer of 1956. The cost of the San Francisco-Honolulu portion would probably be of the order of \$40 million with an additional \$80 million for the section beyond Honolulu. A preliminary review indicates that the portion from San Francisco to Honolulu could probably be undertaken by private industry if there were indicated demand for use of the circuits for defense purposes upon completion. On a normal peacetime basis, such a cable would probably not be planned before 1960, and the section beyond Honolulu could probably not be justified as a commercial undertaking in the foreseeable future, which is beyond the most critical period from the standpoint of potential jamming.

## RECOMMENDATION

In order to minimize our vulnerability from jamming in the period 1955-60, it is recommended that

(a) Negotiations be concluded with the Commercial Pacific
Cable Company to purchase and activate the existing cable
for use as an emergency measure for a reasonable sum
(probably of the order of \$250,000).

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## CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) The Department of Defense immediately include in its planning forward scatter radio systems beyond Honolulu to reach strategic military locations in the Far East.
- (c) Exploration be undertaken with the commercial companies in order to ascertain the bases under which a modern repeater telephone-telegraph cable could be provided between San Francisco and Honolulu at the earliest practicable date.

Upon completion of the present Trans-Atlantic program in late 1955-56 and the carrying out of the above recommendations in the Pacific during 1956-57, it should afford us a relatively secure system from the standpoint of jamming and would provide a fairly positive means of communication.

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